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in incidental sequence learning situations, there is often a number of participants who can report 
the task-inherent sequential regularity after training. two kinds of mechanisms for the generation 
of this explicit knowledge have been proposed in the literature. First, a sequence representation 
may become explicit when its strength reaches a certain level (cleeremans, 2006), and secondly, 
explicit knowledge may emerge as the result of a search process that is triggered by unexpected 
events that occur during task processing and require an explanation (the unexpected-event hy-
pothesis; haider & Frensch, 2009). our study aimed at systematically exploring the contribution 
of both mechanisms to the generation of explicit sequence knowledge in an incidental learning 
situation. We varied the amount of specific sequence training and inserted unexpected events into 
a 6-choice serial reaction time task. results support the unexpected-event view, as the generation 
of explicit sequence knowledge could not be predicted by the representation strength acquired 
through implicit sequence learning. rather sequence detection turned out to be more likely when 
participants were shifted to the fixed repeating sequence after training than when practicing 
one and the same fixed sequence without interruption. the behavioral effects of representation 
strength appear to be related to the effectiveness of unexpected changes in performance as trig-
gers of a controlled search.
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IntroductIon 
Everyday life offers many opportunities to learn about environmental 
regularities. It is likely that a large part of this learning is not driven by 
an explicit intention to learn. A strong example of the latter possibility 
is the acquisition of one’s native language, which occurs at an age when 
explicit learning strategies are not yet available and grammatical rules 
cannot be reported. Therefore, it may be argued that in many cases 
learning takes place implicitly. People neither have an intention to 
learn, nor do they necessarily become aware of the regularities they 
have acquired (cf. Frensch, 1998). Most action sequences (motor as 
well as cognitive) are probably learned this way: “by doing” and without 
top-down control through a declarative representation of the regularity 
underlying the composition of the task material. 
A  widely  used  experimental  paradigm  to  investigate  incidental 
learning  is  the  serial  reaction  time  (SRT)  task,  first  introduced  by 
Nissen and Bullemer (1987). In this task participants have to respond 
to the location of an asterisk on the computer screen by pressing one 
of four response keys. The key feature of the task is that target loca-
tions on consecutive trials are predetermined and follow a repeating 
pattern. There is ample evidence that such spatio-temporal relations 
between successive events can be learned and that they can influence AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology reseArch Article
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task performance, even when participants find it difficult or impossible 
to describe the regularity verbally (for overviews, see e.g., Frensch & 
Rünger, 2003; Shanks, 2005; Stadler & Frensch, 1998). Therefore, when 
learning happens without the explicit intention to learn (cf. e.g., the 
definition of incidental learning in Frensch, 1998) the acquired know-
ledge is often implicit. On the other hand, many studies in the implicit 
learning literature report that at least some participants acquire ex-
plicit knowledge about the hidden regularity in a sequence learning 
task (e.g., Buchner, Steffens, Erdfelder, & Rothkegel, 1997; Zirngibl & 
Koch, 2002). Moreover, profound performance gains have been linked 
to awareness of task regularities (e.g., Haider, Frensch, & Joram, 2005; 
Rünger & Frensch, 2008; Tubau, Hommel, & López-Moliner, 2007), 
and there is evidence that people (e.g., Gaissmaier & Schooler, 2008) 
and even rats (e.g., Harlow, 1949; Tolman, 1948), under some circum-
stances, spontaneously engage in an active search for environmental 
regularities. This raises the question of how and when people become 
aware of these regularities. Two theoretical accounts can be distin-
guished that either emphasize the role of a continuous strengthening 
of memory representations or propose the idea of explicit hypotheses 
testing in the generation of explicit knowledge.  
According  to  the  first  theoretical  account  (Cleeremans,  2006; 
Cleeremans & Jiménez, 2002), learning is a mandatory consequence of 
task processing. The quality of a memory representation – its stability, 
strength, and distinctiveness – increases gradually over the course of 
learning. Quality, in turn, determines the influence of a representation 
on behavior as well as its availability to consciousness and to intentio-
nal control. Once a representation enters awareness by dint of its high 
quality, other controlled operations (such as recoding into linguistic 
propositions and the generation of metaknowledge) become possible. 
Importantly, Cleeremans and Jiménez (2002) posit a direct relation 
between the gradually increasing strength of the memory representa-
tion and the emergence of explicit knowledge. In an incidental learning 
situation, repeated exposure to an environmental regularity gradually 
strengthens representations that support behavioral adaptation to the 
regularity. A sufficiently strong representation of this regularity enables 
the individual to verbally report the regularity and to use this know-
ledge to perform the task at hand more efficiently. 
According to the second theoretical approach (see Frensch et al., 
2003; Haider & Frensch, 2005, 2009; cf. also Clapper & Bower, 2002; 
Sun, Merrill, & Peterson, 2001), there is no such direct relation be-
tween  the  quality  or  strength  of  memory  representations  acquired 
through incidental learning and conscious awareness of the regularity. 
According to the so-called unexpected-event hypothesis (see Frensch 
et al., 2003; Haider & Frensch, 2005, 2009), explicit knowledge about 
an  incidentally  experienced  regularity  is  generated  by  a  controlled 
search in addition to regular task processing. This search is triggered 
by unexpected events that occur during task processing and call for an 
explanation. While performing an incidental sequence learning task, 
for instance, subjects may experience an unexpected feeling of fluency 
that does not correspond to the perceived task difficulty, and while 
searching for the origin of the unexpected fluency they find the regular 
pattern built into the task. 
Support for the unexpected-event hypothesis comes from a study 
by Rünger and Frensch (2008). They conducted a series of experiments 
with the SRT task in which they tested the impact of changes in the 
sequential structure on the likelihood to develop verbalizable sequence 
knowledge. Compared to a condition with no change in sequence 
structure, they found that more participants acquired explicit sequence 
knowledge when they repeatedly transitioned back and forth between 
two  different  systematic  sequences.  The  authors  assumed  that  the 
shifts functioned as unexpected events. Presumably, participants had 
adapted to the SRT task by implicitly learning the systematic patterns. 
Therefore, shifts from one fixed sequence to the other should have 
disrupted participants’ performance. In search for the causes of these 
unexpected changes in their behavior, participants were then likely 
to discover the repeating sequence structure(s). Haider and Frensch 
(2009) manipulated the occurrence of unexpected events more directly 
and demonstrated that artificially induced (computer generated) pre-
mature responses can increase the availability of reportable knowledge 
about a task regularity.
Assuming explicit knowledge to be the result of a controlled search 
implies that (a) unexpected events (and the subsequent search pro-
cess) do not have to be a direct consequence of implicit learning, and 
(b) likewise, that the result of the search needs not be related to the 
specific implicit representation and its strength. Thus, the unexpected-
event hypothesis and Cleereman’s memory-strength account differ in 
how the link between implicit learning and the generation of explicit 
knowledge is conceptualized. According to Cleeremans (2006), the 
distinction  between  implicit  and  explicit  knowledge  is  a  matter  of 
representation strength, while Frensch and collaborators (2003) posit 
dedicated memory systems for implicit and explicit learning.
The aim of the present study was to examine the role of an inci-
dentally acquired sequence representation and of the occurrence of 
unexpected events in the generation of explicit, verbalizable sequence 
knowledge. Specifically, we wanted to know if the occurrence of ex-
plicit sequence knowledge is determined by the increasing strength of 
an implicit sequence representation, or if it is, at least to some extent, 
independent of representation strength.
Experimental approach 
In our experiment, we scrutinized two ideas: (a) the assumption that 
increasing  the  strength  of  a  sequence  representation  increases  the 
probability of generating verbalizable sequence knowledge, and (b) the 
possibility that unexpected changes in one’s performance trigger a con-
trolled search for the cause of these changes that may lead to explicit 
sequence knowledge. With regard to the first issue, we experimentally 
manipulated the amount of practice with a repeating sequence. To 
investigate the second issue, we focused on participants’ expectations 
about the timing of events. Rünger and Frensch (2008) sought to in-
duce unexpected changes in task performance by shifting participants 
repeatedly between two different sequential regularities. In the present 
study, we took a more direct approach and induced deviations from 
the expected timing of events by manipulating the response-stimulus 
interval (RSI).     AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology reseArch Article
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Participants performed a modified version of the SRT task with a 
repeating six-element first order conditional (FOC) sequence (cf. Reed 
& Johnson, 1994). In all experimental conditions, 300 training trials 
were followed by a manipulation phase that consisted of 180 trials (see 
Table 1).
Two groups practiced the task with random material before being 
exposed to the systematic sequence. For three groups, the task started 
with a repeating sequence. While this sequence continued throughout 
the whole experiment for two of these groups, the third group was 
transferred to a different repeating sequence during the final 180 tri-
als. If the strength of the sequence representation plays a pivotal role 
in the generation of explicit sequence knowledge, more participants 
should acquire explicit knowledge in the groups with sequence train-
ing than in the groups with random training. Crucially, according 
to the account of Cleeremans and collaborators (Cleeremans, 2006; 
Cleeremans & Jiménez, 2002), this should hold for the two groups that 
were exposed to just one regular sequence throughout the experiment, 
but not for participants that were shifted to a different fixed sequence 
in the manipulation phase. In their view, the representation of a spe-
cific sequence becomes available to consciousness due to continuously 
operating learning mechanisms, it reaches a sufficient level of quality 
or strength. Prior strengthening of a different sequence representation 
should hinder rather than help the generation of awareness of the 
systematic sequence introduced in the final phase of the experiment. 
According to the unexpected-event hypothesis, however, a shift from 
one systematic pattern to a different fixed sequence can increase the 
chance that verbalizable knowledge is generated. 
In order to investigate the effects of unexpected events with regard 
to timing, we introduced deviations from the standard RSI in two ex-
perimental groups. For one of the groups with random training and 
one of the groups exposed to a single repeating sequence, the timing 
manipulation was introduced in the last 180 trials. We reasoned that if 
unexpected changes in the perceived timing of task performance can 
trigger the generation of explicit sequence knowledge, more partici-
pants should be able to verbalize the sequence in the groups with the 
timing manipulation than in the respective control groups without a 
timing manipulation. 
We conducted a pilot experiment to determine the magnitude of 
our RSI manipulation. Sixteen participants performed 15 blocks of 
the same six-choice SRT task that was used in the current experiment. 
Each block contained four different RSI manipulations (each once) at 
randomly selected positions within the block: RSI was shortened on 
one trial by 100 ms relative to the standard RSI of 400 ms, and on one 
trial by 200 ms. One triplet of consecutive trials was presented with an 
RSI shortened by 100 ms, and one triplet of trials with an RSI short-
ened by 200 ms. The question “Was the last trial faster than usual?” 
(German: “War das Tempo zuletzt schneller?”) was displayed following 
deviant trials and standard trials with the same frequency. We found 
that participants were most likely to experience a relative increase in 
speed when the RSI was shortened by 200 ms on three consecutive tri-
als. The mean probability of indicating an “increased tempo” was 51% 
after trial triplets deviating by 200 ms (32% after comparable trials with 
standard RSI, 35% after triplets deviating by 100 ms, 38% after single 
200 ms-deviants, and 37% after single 100 ms-deviants). 
Deviations in RSI are not the only potential source of unexpected 
events. In line with previous findings by Rünger and Frensch (2008), 
we assumed that the transition from one repeating sequence to another 
provides a different means of inducing unexpected events. Responding 
to targets that follow a sequence different to the one that was learned 
implicitly should lead to an increase in reaction time (RT). In contrast 
to the unexpected speed-up induced by the RSI manipulation, par-
ticipants should experience an unexpected slowing of their responses. 
An increased number of participants who acquired explicit sequence 
knowledge after being transferred to a novel sequence would support 
the notion that the effectiveness of unexpected events related to one’s 
own motor performance is not restricted to the specific sequence re-
presentation acquired during training. Since the slowing of responses 
after a pattern shift should occur continuously over several trials, this 
manipulation might be even more effective than artificially inducing 
an unexpected speed-up in a limited number of trials. 
Method 
Participants 
We recruited 284 participants (Mage = 24.9, SD = 4.22), predominantly 
students at Berlin universities, to take part in the experiment. They 
were paid 4 € for participation. Thirty-two participants had to be ex-
cluded from the main analyses because they either reported that they 
had participated in a similar (incidental learning) experiment before or   
already expected to encounter some form of hidden regularity before 
they even started to perform the SRT task. The remaining participants, 
152 women and 100 men, were assigned to the five experimental condi-
tions. Thirty-four women and 25 men made up the control group with 
random training (RandomC), 21 women and 16 men made up the group 
with random training and a timing manipulation during the last 180 
trials (RandomRSI), 41 women and 15 men comprised the control group 
with a repeating sequence from the beginning of training (SequenceC), 
31 women and 25 men comprised the group with sequence training 
Experimental group
Training phase 
(300 trials)
Manipulation phase 
(180 trials)
RandomC Random sequence Regular sequence
SequenceC Regular sequence Regular sequence
RandomRSI Random sequence Regular sequencea
SequenceRSI Regular sequence Regular sequencea
SequenceT Regular sequence New regular sequence
RSI = response-stimulus interval. C = control. T = transfer.
a  RSI was shorted in 18 trial triplets. 
tAble 1. 
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and timing manipulation (SequenceRSI), and 25 women and 19 men 
made up the group with sequence training and an alternate sequence 
in the final 180 trials (SequenceT). 
Apparatus
Stimulus presentation, RT measurement, and response recording were 
implemented on IBM compatible PCs with 33 cm color monitors and 
standard German QWERTZ keyboards. The viewing distance was ap-
proximately 60 cm. A large colored rectangle (8 cm wide and 6 cm high) 
and six small colored squares (side length = 2.5 cm) were displayed 
simultaneously on a light gray background. The large rectangle was 
centered in the top half of the display, 3 cm below the top of the moni-
tor. The six small squares, subsequently referred to as Target Squares 1 
to 6, appeared 3.5 cm from the bottom of the monitor and 9 cm below 
the top rectangle. They were separated horizontally by 2 cm, except 
for the third and fourth squares, which were spaced 3 cm apart. Each 
target square was mapped to a spatially compatible response key on the 
computer keyboard: [X],[C], [V], [B], [N], and [M]. The response keys 
were labeled 1 to 6 from left to right. The same six colors (green, red, 
cyan, dark gray, magenta, and blue) were used on every trial, but each 
square changed its color pseudorandomly from one trial to the next. 
Materials 
In all conditions (sequence and random training conditions) response 
locations were governed by a repeating six-element FOC sequence 
during the last 180 trials with the SRT task. Each of the six possible re-
sponse locations occurred once in the sequence (e.g., “1−5−2−6−4−3”). 
Consequently, the response location on any given trial was predictive 
of the response location on the next trial. Our SRT task contained no 
further sequential regularities other than the repeating sequence of 
response locations. Each participant was randomly assigned to a six-
element sequence that was drawn from a pool of 70 sequences. The 
sequences were permutations of the six response locations that satis-
fied the following conditions: First, “runs” of three or more adjacent 
response locations (e.g., “1−2−3,” “2−3−4−5,” “6−5−4”) were not per-
mitted. Second, adjacent response locations (e.g., “1−2,” “3−4,” “6−5”) 
could not occur more than twice within a sequence. We employed a 
six-element first order conditional sequence because prior works  (e.g., 
Rünger & Frensch, 2008) indicated that such a sequence can be disco-
vered relatively easily, if one searches for a regularity. A longer sequence 
or a sequence with fewer response alternatives that includes second or-
der transitions would likely lead to the development of partial explicit 
knowledge in many participants. In contrast, previous studies in our 
lab showed that fixed sequences of six responses produce bimodal dis-
tributions. After the training phase, the majority of participants were 
able to verbalize either the whole sequence or nothing at all.
Participants in the conditions with sequence training received the 
repeating sequence of response locations from the beginning. In the 
SequenceT group, response locations in the final 180 trials followed 
a  different  repeating  sequence  that  was  selected  pseudorandomly 
from the pool of 70 sequences with the constraint that the second 
sequence could not share any transitions between adjacent sequence 
elements with the training sequence. For example, if response loca-
tion “2” preceded response location “1” in the training sequence, then 
response location “2” had to be followed by a location other than “1” 
in the transfer sequence. In the training phase of the Random groups, 
response locations occurred randomly with the constraint that repeti-
tions were not allowed.
Procedure
Participants were told that they were taking part in a simple choice RT 
experiment designed to see how practice affects the ability to discrimi-
nate colors. They were not informed of the fact that correct response 
locations could follow a repeating pattern. Learning of the sequential 
regularity was thus incidental. Instructions for the SRT task were pre-
sented onscreen in the presence of the experimenter and followed by 
40 warm-up trials during which response locations were determined 
randomly with the constraint that a response location could not be 
used on consecutive trials. The warm-up trials were repeated if a par-
ticipant made mistakes on more than 20% of the trials. Response loca-
tions during the training phase (first 300 of 480 trials) in the Random 
groups were determined in the same manner as the warm-up trials. 
The experiment comprised four blocks, during which participants 
performed the six-choice color matching version of the SRT task. Each 
block consisted of 120 trials, for a total of 480 trials. The RandomC and 
RandomRSI groups performed 30 repetitions of the six-element FOC 
sequence in their last one and a half experimental blocks, and 300 
randomly sequenced trials in their first two and a half blocks. The 
SequenceC and SequenceRSI groups performed a total of 80 sequence 
repetitions throughout Blocks 1 to 4. On each trial, participants had to 
determine which of the six target squares at the bottom of the screen 
matched the color of the large rectangle on top and to press the re-
sponse key that was assigned to that target square. They responded to 
Target Squares 1, 2, and 3 with the ring, middle, and index fingers of 
their left hands, and to Target Squares 4, 5, and 6 with the index, mid-
dle, and ring fingers of their right hands, respectively. 
The first target location in each trial block was determined ran-
domly with the constraint that the response location had to differ from 
the response location on the final trial of the previous block. Thereafter, 
response locations were chosen according to sequential regularity or 
randomly in the first two and a half blocks of groups with random 
training. A trial ended when a participant pressed one of the six re-
sponse keys. In the case of an erroneous response, participants heard a 
beep for a duration of 100 ms. When the response key was released, the 
screen blanked after 200 ms, and the next trial began 200 ms later. The 
total RSI was therefore 400 ms. Response latencies were measured from 
the onset of a trial to the depression of the response key. Participants 
received feedback about their mean RTs and error rates after each 
block of 120 trials. If the error rate exceeded 10%, participants were 
prompted to make fewer mistakes. 
During  the  last  one  and  a  half  experimental  blocks  in  the 
RandomRSI and SequenceRSI groups, the RSI was shortened by 200 ms 
in 30% of the trials in the following way. The screen blanked imme-
diately after the response, and the next stimulus occurred 200 ms later AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology reseArch Article
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(resulting in an RSI of 200 ms in contrast to the standard RSI of 400 ms) 
on three consecutive trials. These 18 triplets of trials were placed quasi 
randomly within the sequence of trials with two constraints: Between 
two trial triplets with shortened RSI, at least three trials with standard 
RSI had to be presented, and the starting trials of the triplets had to meet 
each position within the repeating response sequence equally often. 
Upon  completion  of  the  final  block  of  trials,  the  experimenter 
returned to the testing cubicle and assessed participants’ reportable 
knowledge about the sequence presented in the manipulation phase 
in a semi-structured interview. The experimenter presented a cue card 
with six boxes labeled 1 to 6 and told the participant that the boxes 
represented the six response keys that corresponded to the six target 
squares. The experimenter then declared that responses in the final one 
and a half experimental blocks followed a regular pattern and asked 
the participant to verbally describe the serial order of response loca-
tions by referring to the labels on the cue card. In order to prevent any 
spontaneous typing activity, we asked participants to cross their arms 
in front of their upper body and hold a pencil in each hand while they 
attempted to report the sequence of response locations. Note that we 
deliberately deviated from the common strategy of opening the as-
sessment of verbalizable sequence knowledge with general questions 
about the task as, in our view, a clear focus on the relevant serial-order 
information ensures maximum sensitivity of the verbal report measure 
(Rünger & Frensch, 2010). 
In line with the theoretical focus on the generation of verbalizable 
knowledge in an incidental learning task (cf. Rünger & Frensch, 2010), 
our dependent measure was the free verbal report described above. In 
order to gain exploratory evidence on the relative sensitivity of cued 
verbal report, we additionally assessed it as a second measure. As this 
was done after the free verbal report, reactive effects of the first test 
of explicit sequence knowledge are possible. However, as subsequent 
administration of both tests seems to be the only way to gain any in-
formation on the correlation of the respective measures, we decided to 
include the cued test nevertheless. For the cued recall test, the experi-
menter named the six response positions in random order and par-
ticipants were asked to indicate the two following response positions 
in each case. After each answer, they provided a confidence judgment. 
After this cued recall test, participants who verbalized a sequence at 
the beginning of the interview were asked in which block of the experi-
ment they detected it. A final question prior to debriefing concerned 
any preexisting notions regarding the purpose of the experiment and, 
in particular, regarding hidden regularities. If a participant indicated a 
priori expectations about a hidden regularity, he or she was excluded 
from further analyses. 
results 
Evaluation of explicit sequence 
knowledge
We focused on free verbal report (as described above) as assessment of 
explicit sequence knowledge and will report on cued verbal report at 
the end of the Results section. Participants were categorized as “verba-
lizers” if they correctly reported at least four consecutive elements of 
the sequence that was presented in the final 180 trials of the experi-
ment. In a previous work, Rünger and Frensch (2008) estimated the 
probabilities of reporting the entire sequence or parts of the sequence 
by mere guessing. The probability of producing a correct quadruple by 
guessing was determined to be less than 3% (see Rünger & Frensch, 
2008, p. 1016). This corresponds to our observation that participants 
who verbalized at least one correct quadruple also reported that they 
became aware of the response sequence during the experiment and 
reproduced it in a fluent manner, typically swapping two adjacent ele-
ments in the case of an incorrect report. Therefore, we decided to use 
this dichotomous measure (proportion of verbalizers as an estimate for 
the probability to generate explicit sequence knowledge) for compari-
sons between experimental conditions rather than calculating a group 
average of the raw verbal report data.
Overall proportion of verbalizers 
The proportion of verbalizers was 20.3% in the RandomC condition, 
21.6% in the RandomRSI condition, 30.4% in the SequenceC condition, 
35.7% in the SequenceRSI condition, and 38.6% in the SequenceT condi-
tion (see Figure 1). Before turning to the four conditions that crossed 
the factors RSI and sequence training, we evaluated the SequenceT 
condition. Participants in this condition outperformed participants in 
the other conditions numerically. First, from the standpoint that repre-
sentation strength accumulates for a specific systematic sequence until 
it becomes verbalizable (Cleeremans & Jiménez, 2002), the RandomC 
condition can serve as a baseline. Participants in the SequenceT and 
the RandomC condition received the same amount of training with 
the specific sequence for which reportable knowledge was assessed.   
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Figure 1.
Percentage of participants categorized as “verbalizers” in the five 
experimental groups with randomized and systematic training. in 
the manipulation phase, all groups received a systematic sequence 
which was the same as before in the sequencec and sequencersi 
groups and a new one in the sequencet group. the manipulation 
phase of the rsi groups additionally contained shortened rsi trip-
lets. error bars represent estimated standard errors for percent va-
lues. rsi = response-stimulus interval. c = control. t = transfer.
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The  overall  number  of  verbalizers  in  the  SequenceT condition was 
significantly higher than in the RandomC condition, χ²(1, N = 103) = 
4.17, p = .04. This result cannot be explained by the representational 
strength of the specific sequence as participants in both conditions did 
not practice it before the manipulation phase. The amount of training 
with the sequence for which verbal knowledge was assessed was exactly 
the same in both conditions. Thus, the type of training (random or 
sequenced) affected the probability of detecting the transfer sequence 
independently of its representation strength, possibly by causing unex-
pected changes in performance.
Second,  a  comparison  of  the  SequenceT  condition  with  the 
SequenceC condition seems reasonable. Based on the findings of Rünger 
and Frensch (2008) and the notion of unexpected events as triggers 
of search processes, a shift to a different sequence (i.e., SequenceT) 
could potentially lead to rates of verbalizable knowledge that are even 
higher than the ones obtained after continuous practice of a single se-
quence (i.e., SequenceC). However, the proportion of verbalizers in the 
SequenceT group did not differ significantly from the overall propor-
tion of verbalizers in the SequenceC condition, χ²(1, N = 100) = 0.75, 
p = .39. It is notable though, that participants in the SequenceT group 
acquired at least the same amount of verbalizable sequence knowledge 
as those in the SequenceC condition despite the fact that they received 
less than half the amount of training with the specific sequence that 
was administered in the SequenceC condition. 
We  now  turn  to  the  four  conditions  that  crossed  the  factors 
prior sequence practice and RSI manipulation (RandomC, RandomRSI, 
SequenceC, SequenceRSI). First, the effect of the timing manipulation 
on the proportion of verbalizers was tested separately for the random 
training and sequence training conditions. While the proportion of 
verbalizers was numerically larger in both conditions when the RSI 
manipulation was present versus when it was absent, there was no 
significant difference; random training: χ²(1, N = 96) = 0.23, p = .88; 
sequence training: χ²(1, N = 112) = 0.36, p = .55. The effect of RSI 
remained statistically insignificant after pooling the data of the two 
training conditions, χ²(1, N = 208) = 0.62, p = .43. Therefore, we as-
sessed the effect of training (sequence vs. random) by collapsing over 
the RSI conditions. Participants who practiced the systematic sequence 
over the whole experiment (SequenceC together with SequenceRSI) were 
more likely to acquire verbalizable sequence knowledge than partici-
pants who practiced the sequence in the final 180 trials only (RandomC 
together with RandomRSI), χ²(1, N = 208) = 3.87, p = .05. Thus, more 
sequence training led to more explicit sequence detections, but the 
violation of timing expectancies did not. This result supports the re-
presentational strength hypothesis (but see below).
Summing up, we observed that, overall, there was more explicit 
sequence knowledge after sequence training as compared to random 
training. However, note that this effect does not have to be based on 
differences in sequence representation strength: When the fixed se-
quence was present during training, then a spontaneous search could 
succeed at any point in time in the experiment. During random train-
ing however, a search for task regularities could not be successful. If 
one assumes that at any point in time during the experiment, a search 
for regularities spontaneously occurred with some fixed probability 
(cf. Gaissmaier & Schooler, 2008), then the cumulative probability that 
such a search uncovered the systematic pattern by the end of the ma-
nipulation phase is higher if the regularity could be discovered in the 
training phase and in the manipulation phase (i.e., in the groups with 
systematic training), as opposed to the situation in which the regularity 
could be caught in the manipulation phase only (i.e., in the groups with 
random training). 
The probability of sequence 
detection within the manipulation 
phase 
The results presented so far are not consistent in that neither repre-
sentation strength nor unexpected events provided an unequivocal 
explanation. Since the last 180 trials of the experiment are critical 
for assessing the effects of our manipulations, we need to know the 
probability of detecting the systematic sequence during this final ma-
nipulation phase. Notably, in the three groups that received a regular 
sequence from the start, there were several verbalizers who reported 
in the interview that they had detected the sequence before the second 
half of the third block (the beginning of the manipulation phase). If 
we want to compare detection probabilities after a certain amount of 
random training and the same amount of sequence training, it is prob-
lematic to include in this analysis the verbalizers who already found the 
sequence during the training phase. Moreover, when considering the 
SequenceT group, the group of verbalizers (participants who recalled 
the sequence of the manipulation phase) includes participants who 
detected the first sequence early in training and were therefore likely to 
search for the second sequence after transfer. It is likely that these ver-
balizers did not discover the second sequence due to the experimental 
manipulation, but because of an a priori awareness of the existence of 
regularities. For a fair comparison of the effects of the different training 
and manipulation conditions, it is necessary to focus on participants 
who did not develop verbalizable knowledge prior to the last 180 trials 
that were structured according to the same systematic sequence in all 
conditions. 
We identified the point in time when explicit sequence knowledge 
occurred by adapting a method described by Haider and Rose (2007). 
Several results in the field of cognitive skill acquisition support the as-
sumption that the time point in training when a sudden and unusually 
large decrease in RT occurs marks the point of insight into a hidden 
regularity that can be used to optimize task processing. Moreover, in 
the study by Haider and Frensch (2002), participants with an RT drop 
were also those who reported in the postexperimental interview that 
they had detected the regularity during training, whereas participants 
without an RT drop were not able to name the regularity. A study in 
which participants were interrupted and interviewed immediately after 
an RT drop revealed that all of these participants were able to name 
the regularity, independent of the number of training blocks they had 
completed before (Haider et al., 2005). In contrast, participants with no 
RT drop were not able to describe the regularity, even after the maxi-
mum amount of training. AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology reseArch Article
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Haider and Rose (2007) described a procedure to identify disconti-
nuities in an RT data series that relies on median filtering (to eliminate 
strong oscillations) and the examination of the minimum-function 
of this filtered data. We applied this procedure to the RT data in the 
current study. For each participant, RTs were filtered with a lag-5 me-
dian filter (the first median was computed over RTs 1 to 5, the second 
over RTs 2 to 6, etc.), with the first four trials in each block remaining 
without an assigned median value. In a second step, we computed an 
individual minimum function of the median RTs. The value of this 
minimum function only changes if the present median is smaller than 
the last value of the minimum function. Thus, it describes the lower 
RT limit over the course of trials. For each participant, we defined the 
trial in which the minimal RT (reflected in the individual minimum 
function of the running RT median) fell below a predetermined level. 
We used 350 ms in the sequence training condition and 400 ms in the 
random training condition as cut-offs for the minimum function. The 
different cut-offs account for the between-group RT differences after 
random  training  and  after  sequence  training  (participants  without 
explicit sequence knowledge only). Note that for participants with no 
verbalizable knowledge, the mean of the minimum functions in the 
last 60 trials of the experiment was 455.42 ms (SD = 61.76) after se-
quence training, and 480.43 (SD = 59.99) after random training. With 
the chosen RT limits we can be reasonably sure that correct responses 
occurring this fast after stimulus onset are extremely unlikely in the 
six-choice color matching task unless the upcoming response can be 
anticipated on the basis of explicit sequence knowledge.  
Next, we analyzed how the assessment of verbalizable sequence 
knowledge and the subjective time point of detection corresponded 
with the occurrence of RT drops. The correspondence was high overall, 
but some exceptions occurred. Fifteen out of 20 verbalizers in the ran-
dom training conditions showed an RT drop during the manipulation 
phase (i.e., when being exposed to the regular sequence). Five did not, 
probably because explicit sequence knowledge was generated near the 
end of the experiment and therefore did not affect task performance 
strongly enough to be detected in the RT analysis. Consistent with 
this interpretation, these participants indicated the fourth block as the 
block of sequence detection in the post-experimental interview. In the 
sequence training conditions, the experimental blocks in which the RT 
drops were found matched the blocks of sequence detection indicated 
in the interview except in the following cases: Three out of 37 verba-
lizers indicated Block 4 and showed no RT drop at all, or one that fell 
short of the 350 ms criterion. These participants were categorized as 
having acquired explicit sequence knowledge at the end of the experi-
ment. One verbalizer without an RT drop indicated that he discovered 
the sequence in Block 2. Finally, one participant correctly reported the 
sequence but denied having detected the sequence during the experi-
ment. This participant also showed no RT drop. Categorizing him as 
a “non-verbalizer” or as a participant who had detected the sequence 
in the last block did not alter the results. In the analyses below he was 
added to the latter category because he matched the recall criterion.
We used the RT drop to filter out those verbalizers in conditions 
with regular repeating sequences throughout the experiment who had 
detected the fixed sequence prior to the manipulation phase (12 verba-
lizers in the SequenceC and 10 in the SequenceRSI group, respectively). 
Filtering was also applied to the SequenceT group, thereby excluding 
nine participants who had become aware of the first sequential regula-
rity in the initial two and a half blocks. The analysis of the proportion 
of verbalizers who acquired explicit sequence knowledge during the 
manipulation phase of the experiment (based on a sample size cor-
rected for the verbalizers who detected the sequence earlier) provides 
a direct test of the unexpected event hypothesis against the memory 
strength view: If a search is more likely to be triggered when there are 
unexpected changes in task processing, we expect a higher percentage 
of (new) verbalizers when the sequence changes (i.e., in the SequenceT 
condition) as compared to the group for which it is identical with the 
one that was practiced before (in the SequenceC condition). While the 
unexpected event hypothesis predicts more sequence knowledge for 
the SequenceT as compared to the SequenceC condition, the reverse 
prediction holds for the strength-based account. Assuming that con-
tinuous practice with a sequence strengthens the representation of this 
sequence until it becomes strong enough to lead to RT drops and ver-
balizable knowledge, one would expect that the SequenceC condition 
yields a larger percentage of verbalizers during the manipulation phase 
as compared to the SequenceT condition. The results, however, support 
the unexpected event hypothesis: The proportion of sequence detec-
tions in the last 180 trials was higher in the SequenceT condition than 
in the SequenceC condition. This difference approached significance in 
a one-tailed test, χ²(1, N = 80) = 2.55, p = .055. Thus, the proportion of 
sequence detections in the manipulation phase appeared to be higher, 
rather than lower, when participants received a different sequence dur-
ing training than when they received the same sequence. This cannot 
be explained by the representational strength hypothesis without dif-
ficulties.
However, it could be argued that the comparison of the probability 
of sequence detection in the last 180 trials between the SequenceC con-
dition and the SequenceT condition is inadequate because it involves the 
Figure 2.
Percentage of participants who detected the sequence in the 
manipulation phase of the experiment (last 180 trials). error 
bars represent estimated standard errors for percent values.
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comparison of different time points on the learning curve for the critical 
sequence (late for the SequenceC condition and early for the SequenceT 
condition). We therefore also compared the number of verbalizers in 
the first 180 trials in the SequenceC condition with the number of late 
verbalizers in the final 180 trials in the SequenceT condition (identified 
by the RT-drop analysis and the interviews). We found that there were 
significantly fewer verbalizers in the SequenceC condition than in the 
SequenceT condition, χ2(1, N = 92) = 4.39, p = .04. To get a more reliable 
result we pooled the data of the SequenceC and SequenceRSI conditions 
that did not differ from each other in the first 180 trials and repeated 
the test. The difference proved to be reliable, χ2(1, N = 149) = 4.66,   
p = .03. Thus, 180 trials of training with a systematic sequence led to 
more participants with verbalizable knowledge if a different regular 
sequence was practiced before, even when participants who assumedly 
had formed explicit knowledge about this other fixed sequence were 
excluded from the analysis. To put it another way, comparing the two 
conditions that were equated for the amount of practice with the spe-
cific sequence of the manipulation phase, we found that prior exposure 
to a different systematic sequence facilitated the generation of explicit 
knowledge, which is not compatible with the representational strength 
hypothesis.
In light of the last finding, it seemed promising to compare the 
proportion of sequence detections during the first 180 trials in the se-
quence training conditions (pooling SequenceC and SequenceRSI) with 
the proportion of sequence detections during the manipulation phase 
in the random training conditions (pooling RandomC and RandomRSI). 
The comparison showed that explicit sequence knowledge was more 
likely to be acquired after random training than without any preceding 
training, that is, in the first 180 trials of the SequenceC and SequenceRSI 
groups, χ²(1, N = 209) = 4.18, p = .04 (see Figure 3). Sequence detection 
was also numerically more likely after random training than after se-
quence training with the same sequence (i.e., in the last 180 trials of the 
RandomC and SequenceC groups), but this difference was not signifi-
cant, χ²(1, N = 103) = 1.47, p = .23 (see Figure 2). Taken together, these 
results suggest that both a shift from a different systematic sequence 
and a shift from randomly structured trials to a target sequence seem 
to facilitate the acquisition of reportable sequence knowledge to some 
degree. This finding accords with the unexpected-event hypothesis. 
Finally, we considered the influence of the timing manipulation 
for the data filtered for sequence detections prior to the manipulation 
phase. Were participants more likely to generate reportable knowl-
edge when they experienced an unexpected speed-up in task perfor-
mance? There was no effect of the RSI manipulation after random 
training; RandomRSI versus RandomC: χ²(1, N = 96) = 0.02, p = .44, 
one-tailed (cf. Figure 2). After sequence training, there was a slight 
tendency  towards  a  higher  detection  probability  if  the  timing  was 
manipulated compared to the group in which it was not manipulated; 
SequenceRSI versus SequenceC: χ²(1, N = 90) = 1.74, p = .09 (one-tailed). 
Though not significant, this result might indicate that if unexpected 
changes in timing affect the probability of acquiring explicit know-
ledge at all, then only if the representation of the specific sequence 
has some strength already. We return to this point in the Discussion   
section.
How are free and cued verbal 
report related? 
For exploratory purposes, the postexperimental interview also con-
tained cued recall. Mean proportion of correct triplets in the cued 
recall test and mean confidence ratings correlated positively (r = .76, 
p < .001). When 50% correct (three out of six triplets completed cor-
rectly) on the cued recall test was taken as criterion for a participant 
to be categorized as possessing explicit sequence knowledge, this clas-
sification correlated substantially with the verbal report classification 
(φ = .73, p <.001). While some participants were classified differently 
based on cued recall as compared to verbal report, an inspection of 
the RT data suggested that free verbal report was the better measure 
as it showed a closer relationship to abrupt changes in task perform-
ance (Haider & Rose, 2007). Verbalizers who did not perform well in 
cued recall, showed similar performance curves as verbalizers who did 
(i.e., RT-drop indicative of sequence detection in either case), whereas 
participants who achieved a high score in the cued recall test but not 
in free verbal report behaved more like other non-verbalizers (i.e., no 
RT-drop indicative of sequence detection).
Is there implicit sequence learning   
in  the  six-choice  color-matching 
task? 
So  far,  we  assumed  that  participants  learned  the  sequential  regu-
larity  of  the  SRT  task  implicitly  and  that  a  subset  of  participants 
then  moved  on  to  generate  explicit  sequence  knowledge.  In  this 
section,  we  analyze  participants’  RT  data  in  order  to  provide 
evidence  for  implicit  sequence  learning.  Each  of  the  four  ex-
perimental  blocks  was  divided  into  two  parts,  resulting  in  eight   
60-trial runs.
Figure 3.
Percentage of participants who acquired their explicit knowledge 
within 180 trials of the first encounter with the specific sequence. 
error bars represent estimated standard errors for percent values.
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Only  one  of  our  experimental  conditions  provides  a  direct 
measure  of  implicit  sequence  knowledge  in  a  within-subject  com-
parison. This is the SequenceT condition where we can look at the 
effect of a transfer sequence on performance. In the following, the 
RandomC  and  SequenceC groups are considered first because their 
comparison  provides  some  indications  of  implicit  sequence  learn-
ing, too. The data of the experimental groups with RSI deviants in 
the  manipulation  phase  are  not  reported  here  because  the  irregu-
larities in timing increase RT variability and obscure the already small   
RT-effects.
There  was  a  more  pronounced  RT  decrease  in  the  SequenceC 
group than in the RandomC group, indicated by a statistical inter-
action of Run and Training Condition, F(7, 791) = 3.39, p = .001,   
η2 = .03. However, if participants categorized as verbalizers in the ver-
bal report task were excluded from this analysis, this difference in the 
run effect was diminished (F < 1), that is, only verbalizers showed 
the effect, F(7, 189) = 4.57, p < .001, η2 = .15. Thus, the larger mean 
improvement in the SequenceC condition appears to be a result of 
explicit sequence knowledge affecting the performance of verbalizers. 
This means that the amount of implicit sequence knowledge acquired   
in  this  experiment  was  possibly  not  large  enough  to  show 
up  in  this  between-group  analysis.  Figure  4  shows  mean 
RTs  for  verbalizers  and  non-verbalizers  in  the  two  training   
conditions.1
We also compared the improvement during the final 180 trials 
(Runs 6 to 8 in Figure 4) with the improvement during the preced-
ing 180 trials (Runs 3 to 5 in Figure 4), separately for each training 
condition, in a within-subject analysis with the factors Part (final vs. 
preceding) and Run (1-3). Only participants without explicit know- 
ledge  (non-verbalizers)  were  included  in  this  analysis.  The  results 
suggest,  at  least  for  the  RandomC  condition,  that  some  sequence 
knowledge was acquired implicitly: There was a main effect of part in 
the RandomC condition, F(1, 46) = 21.16, p < .001, η2 = .32, and in 
the SequenceC condition, F(1, 38) = 23.50, p < .001, η2 = .38, as well 
as a main effect of run in the RandomC condition, F(2, 92) = 7.91,   
p = .001, η2 = .15, and in the SequenceC condition, F(2, 76) = 7.00,   
p = .002, η2 = .16, indicating a decrease in RT over the course of training. 
Importantly, there was an interaction of Part and Run in the RandomC 
group, F(2, 92) = 3.50, p = .03, η2 = .07, but not in the SequenceC 
group,  F(2, 76) = 1.26, p = .29, η2 = .03. The interaction indicates   
that  in  the  RandomC  condition  the  improvement  was  more 
pronounced  in  the  final  part  in  which  some  implicit  sequence 
knowledge  could  influence  performance  as  compared  to  the  pre-
ceding  runs  with  randomized  material.  This  interpretation  seems 
plausible,  given  that  for  ordinary  practice  effects  one  would  ex-
pect a decreasing rate of improvement over the course of training   
instead.
A more effective within-subject test of implicit sequence learn-
ing  is  possible  in  the  SequenceT  group.  A  within-subject  ANOVA 
comparing RTs in the first and second half of the block in which the 
alternate sequence was introduced (Runs 5 and 6 in Figure 5) re-
vealed a significant increase in RT when the repeating sequence was   
changed,  F(1,  42)  =  19.89,  p  <  .001,  η2  =  .32.  This  effect  does   
not  depend  on  explicit  sequence  knowledge  because  it  was  also 
found  in  participants  that  expressed  no  verbalizable  sequence 
knowledge  (interaction  Transfer  Effect  ×  Verbalization:  F  <  1). 
Taken  together,  it  is  evident  that  implicit  sequence  knowledge 
was  acquired  and  expressed  in  the  six-choice  color-matching   
task. 
Figure 5.
Mean reaction times (rts) over the course of the experiment for 
participants with and without explicit sequence knowledge in the 
sequencet group (training with sequential material, transfer to an 
alternate sequence in run 6). error bars represent standard errors 
of the mean (by group and run).
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Figure 4.
Mean reaction times (rts) over the course of the experiment for 
participants of the control groups (randomc and sequencec), with 
and without explicit sequence knowledge in the postexperimen-
tal interview. error bars represent standard errors of the mean (by 
group and run).
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dIscussIon
In this experiment, we studied the influence of unexpected events and 
implicitly acquired sequence knowledge on the likelihood that a fixed 
repeating sequence is (a) detected, (b) used for a pronounced improve-
ment in task performance, and (c) verbalized in a postexperimental 
interview. There appears to be no simple link between the amount 
of practice with a specific sequence and the probability of acquiring 
explicit sequence knowledge. Our initial assessment of verbalizable se-
quence knowledge revealed that training with the systematic sequence 
of  the  manipulation  phase  yielded  more  verbalizable  knowledge 
than  training  with  random  stimulus  material,  a  finding  that  sup-
ports a strength based account of the generation of explicit sequence 
knowledge. However, we also observed that training with a different 
systematic sequence was at least as effective in producing verbalizable 
knowledge about the sequence of the manipulation phase as training 
with the same sequence. 
Subsequent  analyses  that  focused  on  sequence  detections  that 
occurred  during  the  manipulation  phase  further  weakened  the 
strength based view. In these analyses we excluded participants who 
had detected a sequence prior to the manipulation phase based on 
a  validated  procedure  identifying  abrupt  increases  in  performance 
(Haider & Rose, 2007). First, the probability of detecting the six-key 
FOC sequence within 30 repetitions was not higher (in fact, it was 
lower!) after 300 trials of training with the repeating sequence than 
after the same amount of training with randomized material. Second, 
the first 180 trials of exposure to a repeating sequence were more likely 
to lead to detection of the task regularity when they were presented 
after 300 trials of training with randomly sequenced material, than at 
the very beginning of the experiment. Third, detection of the repeating 
sequence was more likely after training with a different fixed sequence 
than with the same fixed sequence. Our results suggest that the genera-
tion of explicit knowledge cannot be explained exclusively on the basis 
of the strength of the implicitly acquired sequence representation, as it 
was assumed, for example, by Cleeremans (2006) and by Cleeremans 
and Jiménez (2002).
The impact of experimentally induced, unexpected changes in tim-
ing on the generation of verbalizable knowledge needs to be explored 
further to allow firm conclusions. The effect of the RSI manipulation 
was weak, if present at all. Furthermore, while it is plausible to interpret 
the effect of transfer to a different fixed sequence as mediated by par-
ticipants experiencing unexpected changes in the speed of perform-
ance (cf. Rünger & Frensch, 2008), a direct proof that sequence transfer 
is effective via this route is still lacking. 
In summary, we presented tentative evidence that inducing an un-
expected RT decrease (due to a transfer from randomized to sequenced 
material) as well as an unexpected RT increase (due to a transfer to   
another  sequence)  resulted  in  a  higher  proportion  of  participants 
acquiring verbalizable sequence knowledge. This is in line with the 
prediction  of  the  unexpected-event  hypothesis  that  experiencing 
something unexpected in one’s processing of a given task calls for an 
explanation and thereby triggers a controlled search process within 
context of the task. If the task contains a regularity that participants did 
not notice before, the search can lead them to discover the regularity 
and to represent it explicitly.  
One might argue that training in our experiment was quite short, 
and that representation strength would have had a larger effect after 
more sequence repetitions. That is, with more training (and a stronger 
sequence  representation),  more  of  the  remaining  nonverbalizers 
might have discovered the regularity. There are some details in our 
experimental data that speak against this possibility. The probability 
of sequence detection should be relatively higher in later than in ear-
lier blocks of the experiment, simply because representation strength 
should,  on  average,  be  greater  in  later  blocks.  However,  we  found 
no difference between the probability of sequence detection in the 
first (10.6%) and in the last 180 trials (11.4%; SequenceC condition). 
Moreover, detection probability at the end of the experiment turned 
out to be higher after random training and after training with another 
(undetected) sequence than after the same amount of training with 
the same (hitherto undetected) sequence. This means that detection 
probability was higher when the implicitly acquired representation 
of the target sequence must have been relatively weak. Therefore, we 
conclude that in the present experiment, sequence detection did not 
depend on the strength of the specific sequence representation. Yet, 
the possibility remains that representation strength affects detection 
probability after much more training than in our study.
In line with the unexpected-event hypothesis, the probability of 
detecting a sequence within 30 repetitions was higher when partici-
pants were transferred to this sequence after performing 300 trials of 
training with another repeating sequence (as compared to the situation 
when the sequence did not change). This effect cannot be accounted 
for by representation strength of the first sequence because reportable 
knowledge was assessed for the unpracticed sequence of the manipula-
tion phase. Further, in all conditions in which a repeating sequence was 
administered from the beginning, there were several participants who 
acquired explicit knowledge before the manipulation phase. This result 
provides a further argument against an explanation that attributes the 
generation of explicit sequence knowledge to representation strength 
alone. Participants who detected the sequence in the first or in the 
second experimental block were unlikely to possess a strong implicit 
sequence  representation.  It  is  likely  that  participants  who  detected 
the systematic sequence in the first blocks had an implicit sequence 
representation of lower strength at the time of detection compared to 
the representation strength in the last training block of participants 
who have never generated explicit sequence knowledge. All in all, the 
results suggest that no especially stable or strong sequence represen-
tation is required for the generation of explicit sequence knowledge. 
Instead, it seems crucial that a controlled search is triggered, and that 
the respective regularity is present in the material at that particular 
point in time. Potential triggers of the search need not be related to the 
strength of the implicit sequence representation. For instance, a feeling 
of unexpected fluency might be induced by (experimental) means that 
are unrelated to sequence learning. However, it is reasonable to assume 
that higher representation strength of an implicitly acquired sequence AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology reseArch Article
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is more likely to trigger a search because it can lead to more distinct 
unexpected events (i.e., fast or premature but correct responses). This 
search can lead either to the detection of the trained sequence (if still 
present) or to a novel repeating sequence, if the regularity has just 
changed. Over the course of a sequence learning experiment (and in 
real life), strengthening of representations proceeds mandatorily with 
continued training. As participants perceive and monitor their own 
behavior and as implicit sequence knowledge affects task performance, 
representation strength should naturally be related to the effectiveness 
of unexpected events as triggers of a controlled search. Such an inter-
action would explain the way in which some participants in standard 
sequence learning tasks (i.e., without artificially induced unexpected 
events) acquire reportable sequence knowledge. 
For  assessing  the  impact  of  the  manipulation  phase  on  verbal 
sequence  knowledge,  we  decided  to  exclude  verbalizers  that  likely 
detected the sequence before the manipulation phase in the final 180 
trials. Interestingly, all verbalizers of the SequenceT group who detected 
the sequence present in the first 300 trials also correctly reported the 
second sequence they experienced in the final 180 trials. Having inci-
dentally detected some regularity once, seems to trigger a search for 
new regularities, if the one first discovered does not longer apply. This 
transfer effect is compatible with the unexpected event hypothesis, and 
less so with a strength explanation (because the representation of the 
second sequence is weak).
Some indications of an indirect link between the strength of the 
implicit sequence representation and the probability of conscious de-
tection of the sequence can also be found in our data. For example, 
for participants who were exposed to the timing manipulation, there 
was a tendency towards a higher detection probability after sequence 
training, but not after random training (cf. Figure 2). Apparently, train-
ing with a regular sequence made participants more sensitive to small 
timing deviations in their performance, possibly because these devia-
tions violated the expectancy of smooth and speedy task performance. 
In line with this possibility, RTs were (numerically, not significantly) 
more variable in the first 60 trials of the manipulation phase than in 
the last 60 trials of the training phase in the SequenceRSI group, which 
was not the case in the SequenceC group. Reliable evidence for a pos-
sible interaction of this kind between implicit sequence knowledge and 
the effectiveness of unexpected events as triggers of search processes 
has been published by Haider and Frensch (2009). They showed that 
the insertion of computer generated (i.e., allegedly) premature correct 
responses increased the probability of rule detection late in training to 
a larger extent than during the first experimental blocks.
Over training, the development of implicit and explicit sequence 
knowledge might be interrelated, but we can only speculate on how a 
search was triggered in participants who detected the sequence very 
early in training. What kind of event can trigger a closer inspection 
of the material before much experience with the repeating response 
sequence has accumulated? One possible account may be found in 
participants’ processing style (global vs. local; cf. Navon, 1977), regula-
tory focus (i.e., promotion vs. prevention; Higgins, 1997), and access 
to higher order information. This possibility has been discussed and 
investigated by Förster and colleagues (e.g., Förster & Higgins, 2010; 
Kuschel, Förster, & Denzler, 2010). Their general idea is that when 
participants are approach-oriented (rather than avoidance-oriented) 
processing tends to become global, attention is distributed more wide-
ly, and access to higher order information (e.g., the semantic content of 
metaphors) is facilitated. Therefore, participants who detected the se-
quence early in our experiment may have processed the color SRT task 
more globally and for example, monitored “subjective randomness” of 
successive trials instead of dealing with each trial as an isolated task to 
be accomplished before the next trial can be undertaken. As a conse-
quence, their expectation of randomness could have been violated early 
in the training phase. These ideas are in line with the unexpected-event 
hypothesis, but they are not directly related to accounts of the genera-
tion of verbalizable sequence knowledge that are based on implicitly 
acquired sequence representation strength. Individual variables such 
as regulatory focus (Higgins, 1997), coping style (approach vs. avoid-
ance; cf. Carver 2006; Carver, Scheier, & Weintraub, 1989), or need 
for cognition (cf. Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996), as well as 
situational variables such as affective states (cf. Kuschel et al., 2010) are 
factors that should also influence the probability of sequence detection 
by affecting the processing style of the individual participant. While 
these factors are worth investigating in the future, they most likely did 
not influence the current results in a systematic way.
conclusIon and outlook
The results of the present study corroborate the notion that explicit 
sequence knowledge is generated if a search is triggered during task 
processing. We propose that the trigger for this search is an unexpected 
event which can, but need not, be related to the amount of preceding 
training or the strength of implicitly acquired sequence knowledge.
Implicit as well as explicit sequence knowledge can contribute to 
performance improvements in sequence learning. Usually, possessing 
and applying explicit knowledge about a hidden regularity speeds up 
performance as correct anticipations become possible. On the other 
hand, relying on more automatic processes (e.g., relying on implicit 
sequence knowledge that pre-activates responses) ensures efficient task 
performance (i.e., mostly fast and correct responses) without requiring 
substantial control resources. The decision between continuing the 
use of previously acquired routines and investing resources in a search 
for promising new regularities might be a strategic one and depend 
on individual preconditions, for instance, available working memory 
capa-city.  These  are  questions  open  to  future  research  with  larger   
samples.
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